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National Sovereignty: Must it be Sacrificed to the 
International Criminal Court?* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The essence of statehood, of being a country distinct from neigh-
boring lands, is the capacity for self-determination. For centuries, if not 
for all of human history, sovereignty has been the core element of dif-
ferentiation between groups, people, and nations. With the rise of in-
ternational agreements, and the formation of multinational trading 
agreements, countries must face questions concerning national sover-
eignty that have never been encountered before. Clearly, increased in-
volvement in international agreements and organizations will require 
countries to cede more and more sovereignty to international govern-
mental organizations.' 
International involvement between nations is not new. 2 The twenti-
eth century, however, has seen an incredible increase in the number 
and variety of international organizations, including the failed League 
of Nations of the 1920s, other post World War I agreements, and the 
United Nations and Bretton Woods agreements following World War 
II. The second half of the century has seen a virtual explosion of gov-
ernmental and non-governmental organizations operating in the world 
arena. 
Despite the phenomenal growth of international cooperation and 
interdependency, the world is increasingly less humane. Conflicts gen-
erating Nazi-like atrocities have increased since the end of that regime, 3 
as exemplified by ethnic conflicts in Rwanda, Bosnia, Indonesia, Sierra 
Leone, and Kosovo. In light of the increased willingness among some 
nations to use such heinous practices, many have concluded that an in-
ternational tribunal of justice is needed.4 War crimes trials at the end of 
• Copyright@ 1999 by David A. Nill. 
1. See Patrick Tangney, The New Internationalism: The Cession of Sovereign Competences 
to Supranational Organizations and Constitutional Change in the United States and Germany, 21 
YALE J. INT'L L. 395, 397 (1996). 
2. See, e.g., HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PAC!S LIBRI TRES (William Whewell 
trans., 1853). 
3. See Daniel J. Brown, Note, The International Criminal Court and Trial in Absentia, 24 
BROOK. J. INT'LL. 763 (1999). 
4. See New Impetus in Establishment of International Criminal Court, AssA-Irada, Feb. 
119 
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the two great wars of the century and the tribunals in operation in 
Rwanda and Bosnia are examples of the need of a permanent institution 
to those espousing this position. 5 Groups arguing for an international 
tribunal of justice were pleased with the acceptance of the International 
Criminal Court ("ICC") created by the treaty in Rome in 19986 and 
looked for its quick ratification by the national governments. 7 
The formation of the ICC opens the door to new and troubling 
questions concerning the future of international justice and its influence 
on national sovereignty. 8 This paper seeks to examine the rationale, 
formation, and current status of the ICC. Further, this paper seeks to 
analyze the hazards presented both by the ICC treaty and by the pre-
sumptions that underlie it. Section II examines the history and current 
status of the ICC. Section III explores several problems that are evident 
under the existing format of the ICC. Section IV proposes alternative 
solutions to the ICC that will be more respectful of national sover-
eignty. 
II. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
The formation of the ICC has been a project long in the making. 
Three trends have contributed to the creation of an international justice 
system: the evolution of violence, the expansion of the media's cover-
age, and an increased sensitivity to human rights. These trends are in-
terrelated, each having played a role in the development of the others. 
War has evolved from the Nineteenth Century model where armies 
avoided civilian populations, to the Twentieth Century pattern of using 
any advantage, even the mass killing of civilians, to gain the upper 
hand. Along with the evolution of tactics, media awareness of atrocities 
15. 1999, available in 1999 WL 10613722. 
5. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-jive Years: The 
Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. Rrs. J. 11, 11 
(1997) ("In the absence of such a court, not only have many atrocities gone unpunished, but every 
one of the ad hoc tribunals and investigations that has been created has suffered from the com pet-
ing interests of politics or the influence of a changed geopolitical situation."). 
6. The Convention for the formation of the ICC was held in Rome on July, 1998, and 
produced the Rome Statute, signed by most of the nations in attendance. 
7. See John R. Schmertz, Jr. & Mike Meier, By Large Majority, U.N. Conference in 
Rome Approves Permanent International Criminal Court, 4 INT'L L. UPDATE 88 (1998) ("On July 
17, after a number of stormy sessions, a mostly jubilant U.N. conference in Rome approved the 
'Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.' The vote was 120 to 7, with 21 abstentions. 
The United States, Israel and China were among those delegations that voted against the Conven-
tion .... The Convention will not enter into force until ratified by 60 nations."). 
8. See Robert J. Howard, Comment, An Economic Paradigm for the Debate Concerning 
the Jurisdictional Extent of the International Criminal Court, 8 TOURO INT'L L. REV. 117, 118 
(1998) (allowing personal jurisdiction from an international body creates the largest jurisdiction 
ever enjoyed). No wonder nations are nervous about the ICC. 
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has also increased. The advent of radio, newsreel film, television, and 
the Internet has brought war crimes increasingly to the attention of na-
tions that are at peace. Finally, an increased awareness of human rights 
has generated the will and the capacity to create change without regard 
to national boundaries. Each of these factors has generated an increased 
desire among nations to find a way to deal with atrocities on the inter-
national level. The ICC has evolved from that desire, but it remains un-
clear whether such a tribunal appropriately addresses the rising tide of 
human rights abuses and whether individual nations will accept its ju-
risdiction. 
A. A Brief History of International Justice 
The history of international justice is fraught with political con-
cerns.9 Following World War I, the Allies formed a tribunal to prose-
cute Kaiser Wilhelm II and Turkish leaders for starting the war. 10 The 
tribunal's powers included authority to prosecute German and Turkish 
military personnel for war crimes. Though charges were brought 
against Turkish officials for massive killings of Armenians in 1915, all 
were granted amnesty because the treaty on which the charges were 
based was never ratified. 11 This occurred in part due to the politics sur-
rounding the rise of Communist Russia. The countries of the Western 
World felt they needed an ally in that region, so they rehabilitated Tur-
key for that role, and past offenses were forgotten. 
The commission did not produce much better results in Germany. 
The Kaiser evaded prosecution. 12 Of nearly nine hundred individuals 
identified as war criminals, only forty-five were submitted to the Ger-
man court for prosecution, and only twelve officers were ultimately 
prosecuted. 13 This emboldened the Nazi generation in Germany. Ad-
olph Hitler, commenting on the lack of consequence for atrocities in 
World War I, said, "Who after all is today speaking about the destruc-
tion of the Armenians?" 14 The failure of the World War I tribunals 
9. See Bassiouni, supra note 5, at 12 (international tribunals have always been subject to 
"realpolitick goals"). 
10. See id. 
11. See id. at 17. The treaty that was ratified, the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, contained no 
provisions for prosecution, but did contain a provision granting amnesty. /d. 
12. See Bryan F. MacPherson, Building an International Criminal Coun for the 21" Cen-
tury, 13 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1, 5-6 (1998) (the U.S. was opposed to prosecuting the Kaiser on the 
grounds that it would violate German sovereignty); Leila Sadat Wexler, The Proposed Permanent 
International Criminal Court: An Appraisal, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 665, 668-69 (1996). 
13. See Bassiouni, supra note 5, at 20. Another source puts the total of identified war 
criminals at 901. See J. Holmes Armstead, Jr., The International Criminal Court: History, Devel-
opment and Status, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 745, 746 (1998). 
14. Bassiouni, supra note 5, at 21 (quoting JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: 
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sparked proposals for a permanent international criminal court, but in 
the face of the Great Depression, nothing developed. 15 
World War II tribunals fared somewhat better, but were still the 
tools of politicians more interested in global positioning than adminis-
tering justice. The Nuremberg trials were born in political disunity. 
Great Britain desired immediate execution for Hitler and his colleagues 
because "their 'guilt was so black' that it was 'beyond the scope of any 
judicial process.'" 16 Stalin favored a special international tribunal just 
for Hitler, his advisers, and senior military leaders. 17 The United States 
and France favored a "tribunal to record history, educate the world, 
and serve as a future deterrent. "18 The trials began under the U.S. and 
French plan; however, British concerns that the trials would become a 
"forum for propaganda and self-justification" were well founded. 19 The 
USSR used the trials to accuse Germany of atrocities committed by 
Russian troops. 20 The United States accused Germany of deliberately 
encouraging Japan to bomb Pearl Harbor, 21 thus allowing the U.S. to 
claim they were victims of German aggression. 22 
The trials in Germany were also marked by hassles and delays be-
cause the officiating nations had disparate ideas on how to apply their 
different notions of justice. Defining the crimes subject to prosecution 
added to the problems as well. Finally, the advent of the Cold War left 
the West in dire need of a strong Germany, and in need of Nazi talent 
to confront the Communist threat. 23 Consequently, the number of trials 
decreased, sentences shortened, and many defendants were acquitted. 24 
The war crimes tribunals in Japan following World War II suffered 
THE POLITlCS AND DIPLOMACY OF PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 15 
(1982) (quoting Adolf Hitler, Speech to the Chief Commanders and Commanding Generals on the 
Obersalzburg (Aug. 22, 1939))). 
15. See MacPherson, supra note 12, at 7; Wexler, supra note 12, at 668-69. 
16. Bassiouni, supra note 5, at 23 (quoting TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE 
NUREMBERG TRIALS 29 (1992)); see also MacPherson, supra note 12, at 8; Wexler, supra note 
12, at 672-73. 
17. See Bassiouni, supra note 5, at 23-24. 
18. /d. at 24. 
19. /d. 
20. See id. (citing J.K. ZAWODNY, DEATH IN THE FOREST: THE STORY OF THE KATYN 
FOREST MASSACRE 5 (1962)). 
21. See Jeremy Rabkin, Editorial, The Dangers of Indicting Milosevic, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
12, 1999, at A22. 
22. See id. 
23. Or, at least in need of keeping Nazi talent out of the hands of the USSR. 
24. Even still, 20,000 individuals were tried with war crimes in the zone tribunals after the 
Nuremberg trials. However, of the 24 high Nazi officials indicted, three were acquitted, 12 were 
sentenced to death, and the remainder were sentenced to prison terms. See MacPherson, supra 
note 12, at 8-9. 
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similar problems. Although some individuals were prosecuted and sen-
tenced, the process was inherently unfair and contrary to the rule of 
law. 25 Ultimately, with tacit approval from General MacArthur, Em-
peror Hirohito issued a proclamation of clemency for all that may have 
committed crimes during the war in 1946.26 
Despite the mixed results in Germany and Japan, the Allies im-
proved international justice. For example, the trials emphasized the 
principle that individuals, regardless of their position in the govern-
ment, could be tried for violations of international law. 27 This principle 
implied that "individuals have international duties which transcend the 
national obligation of obedience imposed by the individual state. "28 
However, brushed aside in the rush to impose justice was the consid-
eration that this still represented the "victor's justice. "29 
These trials are not adequate models for current situations nor for 
the ICC. On the one hand, in both World Wars the international allies 
completely conquered the offending nations. The offending leaders 
were either dead, in custody, or at least potentially available for incar-
ceration. Additionally, evidence was in the hands of the occupying 
forces. Lastly, these were international conflicts where the legal basis 
for international prosecution was stronger. On the other hand, Rwanda, 
Bosnia, and Kosovo (at present without a presiding tribunal) present 
much more complex situations. None of these nations has been over-
thrown by occupying forces. Therefore, the leaders responsible for the 
crimes remain in power or under the protection of the existing govern-
ment. Evidence gathering is next to impossible when the responsibility 
remains in the hands of these governments that are generally hostile to 
the work of the tribunals. Finally, the legal basis for international 
prosecutorial intervention is more tenuous because these conflicts were 
civil wars, rather than international conflicts. Hence, although one may 
argue these recent tribunals are direct descendants from Nuremberg, 
they are actually very different. 
Following World War II the United Nations (UN) was established 
and the work towards creating an international tribunal continued. Most 
25. See Bassiouni, supra note 5, at 33. 
26. See id. at 34 (quoting R. John Pritchard, The Gift of Clemency Following British War 
Crimes Trials in the Far East 1946-47, 7 CRIM. L.F. 15, 24 (1996)). 
27. See MacPherson, supra note 12, at 9. 
28. !d. 
29. See id. at 10. In addition, the Jaws applied to the World War II tribunals were fre-
quently ex post facto in nature. See id. ("[The Allies] reasoned that liability may exist under inter-
national Jaw even if the offense is not spelled out with the specificity of a penal statute, provided it 
is clear that the defendants knew that the conduct was wrong and fundamental principles of justice 
are not offended."). 
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of the effort before 1990 took the form of continuing the codification of 
international crimes. 3° Further development in the 1950s and 1960s was 
stymied due to disagreement over enforcement, jurisdiction, and other 
issues. 31 The growth of international drug trade renewed interest in an 
international tribunal in the 1980s, particularly with the plea for assis-
tance from Trinidad and Tobago.32 The explosion of ethnic and gender 
crimes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda brought the issue to the 
forefront of international attention and impelled the UN towards form-
ing an international court. 33 The death of the bipolar Cold War world 
freed countries from East/West pressures and concerns and focused 
work towards an institution that had been on hold since World War II. 
The culmination of these efforts resulted in the treaty agreement of 
1998, forming the ICC. The creators hoped that the days when one law 
was applied to the victors, and another to the vanquished would end, 
and that political pressure would be removed from the court. 34 This 
hope appears to be early and unsubstantial. 
B. The Desire and Rationale for a Permanent Solution 
Clearly, the problems of international tribunals in the past, along 
with the worldwide increase in violence, have created the impetus to-
wards a multilateral solution. From World War I to Bosnia and 
Rwanda, tribunals have been subjected to national interests and com-
peting types of jurisprudence. Thus, there is a desire for a permanent 
system. 
A permanent system would eliminate the necessity of establishing ad 
hoc tribunals every time the need arises. The decision to establish 
such tribunals, not to mention drafting the applicable statutes, takes 
considerable time during which the evidence of the crimes becomes 
more difficult to obtain, and the political will to prosecute dissipates. 
Moreover, a political debate is invariably reopened over the provi-
sions of the statute, who will conduct the prosecutions, and who will 
sit in judgment. Such pressures leave ad hoc tribunals vulnerable to 
30. See Bassiouni, supra note 5, at 49-55. Codification of crimes was not without diffi-
culty. For example, the definition of aggression took 20 years to develop, but was never voted 
upon in any setting. See id. at 54; Wexler, supra note 12, at 676-77. 
31. See Brown, supra note 3, at 767. For an interesting debate from 1952, see John J. 
Parker, An International Criminal Court: The Case for its Adoption 38 A.B.A. J. 641 (1952), and 
George A. Finch, An International Criminal Court: The Case Against its Adoption, 38 A.B.A. J. 
644 (1952). 
32. See Brown, supra note 3, at 767. 
33. See id. 
34. See Bassiouni, supra note 5, at 49-55. 
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political manipulation. 35 
Much of the desire for a permanent solution arises from the inter-
national abhorrence of the atrocities committed in intra and interna-
tional conflicts. This abhorrence leads to several policy rationales sup-
portive of an international court. The first rationale is deterrence. Many 
people believe that if a permanent court will punish international 
crimes, such as genocide and crimes against humanity, such punishment 
will deter future potential criminals. 36 While this is a general principle 
of criminal justice that is demonstrable at the local level, deterrence be-
comes more theoretical and less capable of proof at the national and 
international level. Nevertheless, supporters of the ICC hold to deter-
rence as an important rationale. 37 Some people are concerned that the 
furtherance of human rights in the world will be stymied as long as 
there is no price to be paid for violating those rights. They argue that 
"[i]mpunity not only encourages the recurrence of abuses against hu-
man dignity, but also strips human rights and humanitarian law of their 
deterrent effect. "38 
Creation of a permanent court would remove the accusation that has 
dogged the ad hoc tribunals. Critics have attacked each of the previous 
attempts at international tribunals as "victor's justice, "39 in part due to 
the lack of universality and specificity in international law. 40 While 
some movement has occurred in the UN to standardize and codify in-
ternational crimes, the structure for the international court has not kept 
pace until this decade. 41 Whether, with the signing of the Rome treaty, 
the legal structure of the international court is sufficiently in place to 
avoid its use as a political tool is yet unclear. 
Another rationale for the creation of the ICC is to address serious, 
35. /d. at 60-61. 
36. But see Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. National/merest?: Hearing 
before the Subcomm. on /nt'l Operations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. 
1, 29 (1998) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (testimony of John Bolton, former Assistant Secretary of 
State for International Organization Affairs). 
37. See Claudio Grossman et a!., International Support for International Criminal Tribunals 
and an International Criminal Court, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1413, 1417, 1436 (1998). Senator 
Arlen Specter states, "I strongly believe that deterrence is a big factor in life. If you prosecute and 
punish people and they know that punishment is a possibility, it will affect their conduct. I believe 
that what is going on right now in The Hague is very important as an international precedent and 
as a matter of deterrence." /d. at 1417. 
38. Jelena Pejic, Creating a Permanent International Criminal Court: The Obstacles to In-
dependence and Effectiveness, 29 COLUM. HuM. Rrs. L. REv. 291, 292 (1998). 
39. Good examples of victor's justice were the tribunals in Japan after World War II. See 
Bassiouni, supra note 5, at 31-37. 
40. See Armstead, supra note 13, at 748. 
41. See id. 
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but heretofore unprosecuted war crimes.42 For example, the use of rape 
as a tool of "ethnic cleansing" in the former Yugoslavia focused the 
world's attention on gender crimes. Upon closer inspection, most of the 
wars of the Twentieth Century contain documented evidence of rape as 
a tool of conquest and domination. 43 In spite of the documented evi-
dence of rape in Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan during World War 
II, neither the Nuremberg nor the Tokyo Charter enumerated rape as a 
crime against humanity. 44 Rape was not included in "crimes against 
humanity" until the Geneva Conventions of 1949.45 Therefore, the 
creation of the ICC afforded the opportunity to codify laws on rape that 
previously received only oblique reference in international agree-
ments.46 
Fairness in the judicial process is also cited as a reason for the es-
tablishment of the ICC.47 For example, many times tribunals are or-
ganized to deal with war crimes solely to punish the vanquished. These 
tribunals are, therefore, open to the valid criticism that their purpose is 
just to achieve "victor's justice" and that the tribunals are in use only to 
exact retribution for the terrors of war. 48 As Justice Murphy said in his 
dissent in In re Yamashita, "If we are ever to develop an orderly inter-
national community based on a recognition of human dignity, it is of 
the utmost importance that the necessary punishment of those guilty of 
atrocities be as free as possible from the ugly stigma of revenge and 
vindictiveness. "49 Additionally, some countries' legal systems do not 
meet international standards of fairness or due process, even in domes-
42. Recent events in Sierra Leone have avoided the headlines, but are indicative of the 
kinds of atrocities the ICC hopes to punish. See David J. Scheffer, Deterrence of War Crimes in 
the 21st Century (visited Sept. 23, 1999) < http://www.iccnow.org/htmllscheffer.html >. 
43. See Nicole Eva Erb, Comment, Gender-Based Crimes Under the Drafts Statute for the 
Permanent International Criminal Court, 29 COLUM. HUM. Rrs. L. REv. 401 (1998) (relating 
and citing the rape of Chinese women by Japanese soldiers invading Nanking, Nazi soldiers raping 
Jewish and Soviet women, Korean women forced into sexual servitude by the Japanese, several 
rapes of Vietnamese women by American troops at the My Lai massacre, Iraqi soldiers raping 
women during the invasion of Kuwait, rapes of female supporters of Aristide occurring during the 
military coup in Haiti, Hutus raping Tutsis and vice versa in Rwanda, and military officials of all 
sides raping targeted ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia). 
44. See id. at 408-10 (stating that the Tokyo charter did include rape as a violation of rec-
ognized customs and conventions of war). 
45. See id. at 410-411. 
46. See id. at 407 ("Traditionally, international legal instruments have not explicitly ad-
dressed the crime of rape or other gender-based crimes committed in armed conflicts."). 
47. See MacPherson, supra note 12, at 17. 
48. See id. The imposition of a foreign version of justice increases the sense of being 
wronged by the process as well. This imposition may increase the sense that such justice is just 
further violence. See infra note 172. 
49. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 29 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
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tic cases.50 The ICC is offered, therefore, as a means of standardizing 
justice and supplanting the legal systems of countries that are otherwise 
incapable of rendering a fair verdict. 
Other reasons supporting the establishment of the ICC include the 
ad hoc tribunal's lack of consistency and failure to establish precedent. 
Past ad hoc tribunals have been marked by a singular lack of consis-
tency and lack of judicial memory. 51 "From a legal standpoint, ad hoc 
tribunals cannot hope to achieve a desired level of consistency in the 
interpretation and application of international law because their statutes 
are inevitably tailored to meet the demands of the specific situation that 
brought them into being. "52 
A related concern, in addition to consistency, is whether the politi-
cal will exists from crisis to crisis to establish a tribunal. 53 Many people 
fear that judicial fatigue will set in, resulting in crimes going unpun-
ished. Questions are naturally raised concerning why one conflict de-
serves a tribunal and another does not. 54 For example, the UN estab-
lished tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, but not for 
Iraq, Somalia, or Sudan. If there were a permanent ICC, the will re-
quired to begin an investigation into atrocities would not depend upon 
the politics of the UN or national leaders. 
Another reason favoring the establishment of a permanent court is 
that countries rarely punish war criminals on their own. 55 Frequently, 
the end of conflict brings a desire to return to normalcy. Additionally, 
conflicts often end with a negotiated settlement between the warring 
parties. Settlement often includes amnesty as a condition for the cessa-
tion of hostilities, freeing otherwise criminally negligent individuals 
from prosecution. New governments may also include individuals who 
are responsible for war crimes. Such countries are naturally unwilling 
to prosecute war criminals. 56 Supporters of the ICC claim that a perma-
nent international institution would have the political distance necessary 
to bring these criminals, regardless of their positions, to justice. 
A structural argument for the establishment of the ICC also exists. 
The creation of a permanent court would be beneficial to the interna-
tional community because it would help address what some internation-
50. See id. at 18. 
51. See MacPherson, supra note 12, at 23. The legal systems of smaller countries may be 
intimidated or overwhelmed with the problem of dealing with international criminals. See id. 
52. See Pejic, supra note 38, at 293. 
53. See Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 35 (testimony of Michael P. Scharf in support of 
the International Criminal Court). 
54. See Pejic, supra note 38, at 293. 
55. For example, Chile has not prosecuted General Pinochet. 
56. See Pejic, supra note 38, at 292. 
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alists see as the main failings of the international system of justice, the 
lack of a permanent and effective enforcement mechanism. 57 The estab-
lishment of a permanent court would enable the international commu-
nity to enforce the law, hence meeting all the goals. 58 However, many 
things must be presumed to reach that conclusion. An international en-
forcement mechanism would require either vast national cooperation or 
some kind of international police force. Neither is likely to be greeted 
with much favor by most nations. Therefore, it is presumptuous to see 
the ICC as establishing an international law enforcement mechanism. 
C. The International Criminal Court Treaty 
The International Criminal Court treaty was signed in Rome on July 
17, 1998. Delegates met for five weeks before they brought the pro-
posed treaty language into a form upon which a vote could be taken. 59 
The vote resulted in 120 delegations voting in favor, seven against, and 
twenty-one abstaining. 60 The United States, China, and Israel were 
among those voting against the treaty. The primary reasons for their 
"no" vote was the broad jurisdiction and the independence of the prose-
cutor.61 
/d. 
57. See id. at 294. 
58. See id. at 328-29. 
In the 50 years since the Nuremberg trials, massive human rights and humanitar-
ian law abuses have been committed-and continue to be committed-worldwide. While 
the international community finally seems poised to end impunity and strengthen deter-
rence by creating a permanent International Criminal Court, the outcome of this effort 
remains uncertain. Guided primarily by political, rather than legal considerations, states 
risk establishing a judicial body that will not be able to fulfill its important tasks. A 
permanent International Criminal Court must be independent and effective if it is to 
meaningfully strengthen accountability for egregious crimes of concern to the interna-
tional community. This means that the exercise of the ICC's jurisdiction must not be 
stymied by political considerations and that the court must be able to effectively prose-
cute and punish the perpetrators of international crimes once its jurisdiction has been 
established. There should be little doubt that the structure set up in Rome will not be 
amenable to easy change. All efforts should therefore [sic] made to ensure the creation 
of a viable institution that will withstand the test of time. Countless victims of past and 
current atrocities deserve no less. 
59. See Brook Sari Moshan, Comment, Women, War, and Words: The Gender Component 
in the Permanent International Criminal Court's Definition of Crimes Against Humanity, 22 
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 154, 170 (1998). This author's description of the conference is inaccurate 
because it implies the treaty language was developed by the delegates. The delegates actually 
worked from the draft prepared by the UN Preparatory Committee. 
60. See id. As of April 13, 1999, 81 countries had signed the treaty. See Czech Republic 
Signs Statute on International Criminal Court, Czech News Agency, Apr. 13, 1999, available in 
1999 WL 15623755 [hereinafter Czech News]. 
61. See Moshan, supra note 59, at 170-71. In spite of these objections, the U.S. delegation, 
as of the Preparatory Commission held in July and August, 1999, seemed willing to sign the treaty 
if they could arrange protection from prosecution for U.S. military personnel and others. 
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Ill. WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT? 
There are many inherent problems with the International Criminal 
Court, some of which are unavoidable. Some non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs) have touted the court as an answer to the problems en-
countered with the ad hoc tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda. These problems include the logistics of transporting witnesses 
and defendants and having thousands (in Rwanda) awaiting trial with 
little movement towards that end.62 An ICC seated at The Hague would 
solve neither of these problems. The problems of transporting wit-
nesses, defendants and attorneys (not to mention housing and feeding 
them) and obtaining passports and visas increase by having the tribunal 
outside the country where the crimes were committed. 
In addition, there is no resolution in the ICC for a second problem: 
many people are accused and there are too few judges. In its current 
conception, the court will not have the capacity to operate more than a 
few trials at a time. 63 Proponents of the court point to this issue as a 
reason to allow future growth in the size of the court. 64 However, it is 
difficult to imagine an international court large enough to handle thou-
sands of trials in a timely fashion, as the Rwandan situation would re-
quire, and yet remain affordable to the world community. 
Currently, a single prosecutor oversees both the Rwandan and Bos-
nian courts, resulting in the problem of overseeing institutions thou-
sands of miles apart. 65 While having a centralized court will relieve 
some of the problems of oversight, 66 it will exacerbate the problems of 
discovery in the nations where the crimes occurred. On-site prosecutors 
have a difficult time gathering evidence. Adding thousands of miles of 
travel will only further complicate the process. 
A counter argument to this problem with the ICC might be that the 
prosecutor could rely on the legal structure of the countries involved to 
provide the "on the scene" assistance, like discovery. This may be 
available in some instances, but it flies in the face of one of the original 
presumptions of the ICC. The court presumes that after an armed con-
flict not every country has, or will have, a legal system in place to per-
form such tasks. Physical distance will still hamper evidence gathering 
62. See Brown, supra note 3, at 771; see also Prosecutor v. Aleksovski (Prosecution Re-
sponse to the Defense for Provisional Release 3.2.5) ICTY Case No. IT-95-14/1-PT (Jan. 14, 
1998) (visited Sept. 17, 1999) <http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p288-e.htm> ("The tribunal in 
Yugoslavia has indicated that incarceration for 577 days while awaiting trial is reasonable."). 
63. See MacPherson, supra note 12, at 56. 
64. ld.; see also infra Part III. D. 
65. See Bassiouni, supra note 5, at 48. 
66. See Brown, supra note 3, at 771-72. 
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and discovery where there is no credible legal system in place to do it 
for the court. Reliance on local legal systems is also problematic be-
cause it depends on their willingness to assist. Discovery is nearly al-
ways an adversarial situation. Attempting to use local law enforcement 
when it too may be resistant will defeat such efforts completely. The 
touted swift justice67 simply will not occur. 
A. Intrusion on National Sovereignty 
Perhaps the central issue facing the ICC is its effect on sovereignty. 
However, most commentators plunge ahead, either tossing the issue 
aside as unimportant in the modern world68 or waving it as a standard 
that should be held inviolate.69 In light of the unthinking treatment sov-
ereignty normally receives, consideration of the differing perceptions 
will be helpful. It is presumptuous to believe that all members of the 
world community accept the same definition of sovereignty as the 
United States. Sovereignty for an American, and for any person from a 
country based on a similar form of government, devolves from the peo-
ple, not the state. Other nations perceive sovereignty as a national right 
belonging to the government. For nations that accept the latter defini-
tion of sovereignty, ceding it to an international entity is less trouble-
some. However, for individuals and nations that accept the definition of 
sovereignty as a power and right emanating from the people, cession to 
international entities is very troublesome. John Bolton, former assistant 
Secretary of State, described this theoretical divide: 
One of the executive branch's strongest powers is the law enforce-
ment power. In the United States we accept this enormous power be-
cause we separate it from the adjudicative power and because we ren-
der it politically accountable through Presidential elections and 
congressional oversight. . . . Europeans may feel comfortable with 
the ICC structure, no political accountability and no separation of 
powers, but that is a major reason why they are Europeans and we are 
not. 70 
67. See id. Justice has been anything but swift in Rwanda, where most detainees remain in 
prison years after apprehension and without a trial. A member of the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for Rwanda (ICTR) at the July PrepCom for the ICC reported that many of the oldest and 
youngest detainees have been released without trial. Apparently, neither the Tribunal nor the 
Rwandan government had the funds to continue maintaining the prisoners while awaiting the gla-
cial process of justice. 
68. See Grossman et al., supra note 37, at 1438; Tangney, supra note 1, at 397. 
69. See Gary T. Dempsey, Reasonable Doubt: The Case Against the Proposed Interna-
tional Criminal Court (July 16, 1998) (visited Sept. 23, 1999) <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-
31l.htrnl >. 
70. Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 31 (testimony of John Bolton). 
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Indeed, in the United States, ceding the "national" sovereignty pre-
sents problems that go to the core of the nation's legal structure. Thus, 
understanding there the are different perceptions of the meaning of sov-
ereignty helps in appreciating the motivations of both those who signed 
and those who refused to sign the treaty. It also aids in recognizing the 
perceptions that different nations have of how the ICC will affect them. 
The ICC treaty establishes personal jurisdiction over the individuals 
in the member states. 71 Necessarily, personal jurisdiction by an interna-
tional organization raises sovereignty issues. Many proponents of the 
ICC minimize the potential intrusions on sovereignty that may occur. 
"Sovereignty concerns will have to be addressed; but ... international 
law is gradually moving away from a State-centrist approach towards a 
more moral, human rights approach. It is imperative that this reality be 
recognized in the jurisdiction and the powers of the court. "72 
International law may well be moving away from a state-centered 
approach, but that movement is not rapid. The formation of the World 
Trade Organization and the number of years required to come to an 
agreement in the Uruguay Round of GATT is strong evidence of the 
importance nations place on sovereignty. Perhaps more importantly, the 
actions of countries in the past decades are even more indicative that 
overcoming sovereignty by a single treaty is a mere dream. 73 
A crucial test for the ICC will take place over sovereignty. The in-
dividual, not the nation, will be subject to the jurisdiction of the court. 
Thus posing the question whether nations would "run the risk of having 
their nationals sent to be tried by judges possibly from enemy or rogue 
nations. "74 Will nations be willing to see their troops, acting as peace-
keepers on foreign soil, come under the criminal jurisdiction of this 
court?75 The answer for many nations, the United States likely included, 
will be no. 76 Nations that would cede to the jurisdiction over their citi-
zens would also face the temptation of allowing jurisdiction only when 
it suited their political goals. 77 Therefore, the ICC would find coopera-
71. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999, 
1003 (1998). 
72. Grossman et al., supra note 37, at 1438. 
73. See Robert F. Drinan, Is a Permanent Nuremberg on the Horizon?, FLETCHER F., 
Summer/Fall 1999, at 103, 105. 
74. Christopher L. Blakesley, Obstacles to the Creation of a Permanent War Crimes Tribu-
nal, FLETCHER F., Summer/Fall1999, at 77, 90. 
75. This concern is certainly on the minds of the Clinton administration and the U.S. Sen-
ate. See Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 17-21. 
76. See Drinan, supra note 73, at 107 (pointing out that the U.S. might have been deterred 
from some of its international interventions had Washington been concerned about individual sol-
diers, generals, or political leaders being haled before an international court). 
77. The Human Rights Watch expresses the concern that nations will avoid jurisdiction by 
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tion only when a nation deemed it expedient. The experiences of the 
International Court of Justice and the World Court are instructive. De-
veloped nations frequently ignore rulings or refuse to be subject to the 
courts when it is in their interest to do so. 78 
Even some who espouse the concept of an ICC acknowledge the 
problem that sovereignty presents: 
States are understandably jealous of their right to investigate and 
try international criminals in their own courts. National pride leads 
states to have faith in the competency and fairness of their domestic 
judicial systems. They do not want to surrender control over criminal 
cases to another tribunal. Certainly, with the exception of the core 
crimes, states are capable of prosecuting the majority of international 
crimes fairly and effectively, and the Statute [for the International 
Criminal Court] should encourage national prosecutions when feasi-
ble. Moreover, victimized states have incentives to pursue cases that 
an international tribunal might lack. 79 
This observation implies that, in most situations, nations do not need 
(and frequently will not want) the ICC because their legal systems are 
capable of handling most of the issues. Historically, nations punished 
for their violence dealt with in a punitive way after a violent period 
tend to make poor members of the world community. Nations allowed 
to resolve their own crimes while receiving different international aid 
fare much better. 80 
An additional problem that the above quote addresses is the issue of 
parity. For example, "[w]hile the United States might take satisfaction 
in conducting trials of those who commit war crimes against its military 
personnel, that satisfaction would hardly be worth the discomfort of 
seeing American servicemen on trial in Baghdad or Tripoli. "81 Any de-
invoking a "national security" privilege. See Human Rights Watch, Section M: The Protection of 
National Security (visited May 5, 1999) <http://www.hrw.org/reports98/icc/jitbwb-15.htm>. It 
states, "[National security] must be balanced against other important and potentially competing 
interests. These would include the interests of victims, and of the international community as a 
whole . . . . Deference to a national security must be tempered by the need to ensure the protec-
tion of international security, which is seriously compromised by the commission of heinous 
crimes and the impunity that so often surrounds them." /d. 
78. See Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 6 (statement of Senator Jesse Helms) (recalling 
the World Court's attempt at exercising jurisdiction over the U.S. for its support of the Nicaraguan 
Contras, and the fact that the U.S. ignored the court due to lack of jurisdiction). 
79. See MacPherson, supra note 12, at 40. 
80. For example, compare post WWI Germany with post WWII Germany. Nuremberg may 
have had some influence, but with the immediate rise of the Cold War, most of the resolution of 
national and individual culpability was left to the Germans. Supporting the thesis of this paper, 
Germany's judicial system was rebuilt by the Allies, and has become one of the most credible in 
the World. 
81. See MacPherson, supra note 12, at 42; see also Howard, supra note 8, at 123-24. 
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veloped nation would feel similarly. Therefore, the likelihood of having 
such investigations by the ICC ignored is high. The U.S. delegation at-
tempted to resolve this at the Rome Conference by preserving the right 
of reservation to specific aspects of the treaty. This proposal was 
soundly defeated by the rest of the delegates. While there may remain 
the option of amending the treaty, some groups are adamantly opposed 
to such a thought. They fear that amendments to the ICC, particularly 
by powerful nations, would only make it a tool of the UN Security 
Council82 and likely administer only "victor's justice." 
The U.S. delegation to the Rome Conference refused to sign the 
treaty for a related concern. In its final form, the treaty extended the 
court's jurisdiction to situations where only one party of the dispute 
came from a signatory member. 83 This amounted to an indirect grant of 
jurisdiction over any person involved in the state where the crimes oc-
curred, regardless of whether their nation was subject to the ICC. The 
U.S. delegation argued that this would create a situation where 
[M]ultinational peacekeeping forces operating in a country that has 
joined the treaty can be exposed to the Court's jurisdiction even if the 
country of the individual peacekeeper has not joined the treaty. Thus, 
the treaty purports to establish an arrangement whereby U.S. armed 
forces operating overseas could be conceivably prosecuted by the in-
ternational court even if the United States has not agreed to be bound 
by the treaty. 84 
The U.S. delegation sought to amend this section, but were over-
whelmingly defeated. 85 Therefore, the treaty signed in Rome may vio-
late national sovereignty by indirectly allowing jurisdiction over nations 
that chose not to be a signatory. A logical ramification of this is that 
nations will be less inclined to send troops to participate in peacekeep-
ing missions, 86 therefore, diminishing security in some parts of the 
world. Primarily for this reason, although the Clinton administration 
favored the ICC, the U.S. delegation refused to sign the treaty. 87 
82. See MacPherson, supra note 12, at 42 (citing Daniel H. Derby, An International 
Criminal Court for the Future, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 307, 311 (1995)). 
83. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 71, at 1010-11; Sen-
ate Hearing, supra note 36, at 12 (testimony of Ambassador David J. Scheffer). 
84. Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 13 (testimony of Ambassador David J. Scheffer). 
85. See id. at 12. 
86. See id. at 13. 
87. See id. at 15-16 ("Our position is clear. Official actions of a non-party state should not 
be subject to the Court's jurisdiction if that country does not join the treaty, except by means of 
Security Council action under the UN charter. Otherwise the ratification procedure would be 
meaningless for governments."). Ambassador Scheffer, in response to queries by the Senate, 
stated that de facto universal jurisdiction, and the independence of the prosecutor were two of the 
most significant factors leading to his refusal to sign the treaty. See id. For another perspective, 
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State cession of sovereignty would cut against both states where the 
crimes occur and those states trying the crimes. 88 For example, the state 
where the crimes are committed must cede its sovereignty in order for 
the court to operate there. In addition, cases may arise where national 
courts try individuals extradited from the state where the crimes oc-
curred. The sovereignty of the trying state would also be subject to 
abridgement as well, because ICC complementarity is merely a cover 
for judicial review. Judicial review occurs when the ICC exercises its 
power to review whether a state court is unwilling or unable to prose-
cute individuals the ICC has determined fall under its jurisdiction. 89 The 
ICC, in this way, may become a part of the state legal process90 by re-
versing or upholding decisions of what were previously courts of last 
resort. 
Supporters of the ICC have overlooked a singular feature of sover-
eignty. Senator John Ashcroft, of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, stated, "If there is one critical component of sovereignty, it 
is the authority to define crimes and punishment. This court strikes at 
the heart of sovereignty by taking this fundamental power away from 
individual countries and giving it to international bureaucrats. "91 Sena-
tor Ashcroft, expressing the sovereignty concerns he felt for the United 
States, continued, 
No aspect of the Court is more troubling, however, than the fact 
that it has been framed without apparent respect for-and indeed in 
direct contravention of-the United States Constitution ... 
The proposed court . . . neither reflects nor guarantees the protec-
tions of the Bill of Rights. The administration was right to reject the 
Court and must remain steadfast in its refusal to join a court that 
stands as a rejection of America's constitutional values. 92 
Pierre Sane. the Secretary General of Amnesty International, "expressed his regret that a few 
powerful countries appeared willing to hold justice hostage by threatening and bullying other 
states, and seemed sometimes to be more concerned to shield possible perpetrators from trial 
rather than producing a charter for victims." International Criminal Court-Crippled at Birth? 
(visited Mar. 19, 1999) <http://www.hri.ca/urgent/icc-0722.shtrnl>. 
88. See Sandra L. Jamison, A Permanent International Criminal Court: A Proposal that 
Overcomes Past Objections, 23 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 419, 432 (1995) ("[T]he absolute 
doctrine that a state is supreme in its own authority, and need not take into account the affairs of 
other nations, is no longer tenable."). 
89. See infra Part III.E. 
90. See Dempsey, supra note 69. 
91. Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 8. 
92. /d. at 9. Senator Ashcroft concludes: 
In Monday's New York Times, there is an opinion piece in which Anthony Lewis 
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A cession of sovereignty that abrogates the fundamental principles 
of any country, whether that sovereignty be the ability to define crime 
and punishment or the establishment of constitutional principles, is a 
cession that cuts too deep. Perhaps the biggest problem with attempting 
to sign away such sovereignty is that nations will not abide by it,93 and 
therefore, the credibility of the court will be diminished, rendering it a 
toothless institution. 
B. Textual Ambiguities and Inadequacies 
Criminal law is successful, as well as consistent and fair, when 
each crime has elements that must be proven in order to convict a de-
fendant. Not only does the ICC fail to contain specific elements for 
crimes, it fails to adequately define the core crimes. For example, the 
delegates insisted on including the crime of "aggression" but utterly 
failed to define it. 94 Defining aggression has proven to be incredibly 
vexing, and there is no clear resolution in sight. 95 The possibility exists 
that there will be concurrent and differing definitions of aggression 
within the UN architecture, leading to inconsistent and unjust applica-
tion of international law. For example, the ICC may find itself at odds 
with the Security Council over whether aggression has occurred. This 
would enmesh the court in the very political thicket the drafters of the 
chastises the United States for missing a historic opportunity by failing to vote in favor 
of the International Criminal Court. The author states that the vote to form the Interna-
tional Criminal Court "will be seen as a turn in the road of history." That is perhaps 
the only point in the piece with which I agree. The approval of this Court was indeed 
"a turn in the road of history." By ceding the authority to define and punish crimes, 
many nations took an irrevocable step to the loss of national sovereignty and the reality 
of global government. I, for one, am heartened to see that the United States took the 
right turn on the road of history, and I will work hard to ensure there is no backtrack-
ing. 
/d. at 10. 
93. See Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 19-20 (questions from Senator Jesse Helms, an-
swers by Ambassador David J. Sheffer). This problem is foreshadowed by the fact that a number 
of countries have constitutional prohibitions on extraditing their citizens to any other nation. 
Therefore, these countries would have to cede this civil right in order to comply with the ICC stat-
ute. See id. 
94. See Czech News, supra note 60. Nine months after the Rome Conference, the UN Pre-
paratory Commission is still attempting to resolve this definition. See id. 
95. See MacPherson, supra, note 12, at 50. 
The United States [delegate] explains the problem: 
/d. 
[l]t is not at all universally established what fits even within the limited concept of 
"waging a war of aggression." What are the possible defenses or mitigating factors ... 
? What if it concerns a disputed territory? Where there is a conflict that is settled by 
reference to the International Court of Justice, for example, does the losing party auto-
matically become guilty of an aggressive war? What about controversial concepts such 
as humanitarian intervention or a war of liberation? 
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ICC sought to avoid.% 
Elements of crimes and rules of procedure shared a similar fate in 
the drafting of the ICC treaty. In the UN Preparatory Committee 
(PrepCom) meetings shortly before the Rome conference, the United 
States delegation pushed for definition of the elements of three core 
crimes: genocide, other crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The 
other states involved argued there was not time to do this and that the 
priority should be on agreeing to the crimes covered by the convention. 
They also argued that since this was a common law approach, definition 
of elements could wait until after the signing of the statute. 97 Since the 
conference and signing of the treaty, the PrepCom has made little prog-
ress in formulating elements or rules of procedure for the court. 98 As of 
March 1999, the Commission had only agreed to a goal of June 30, 
2000 to have draft versions of these rules and elements completed. 99 
Apparently, its hope is that states will ratify the treaty without knowing 
the treaty's final contents. 100 So far only one state, Senegal, has done 
so.JOJ 
The concerns raised by the United States early in the negotiating 
stage about elements to the crimes appear well founded. 102 At the 
March 2, 1999, PrepCom meeting, delegates circulated discussion pa-
96. See id. at 49. (MacPherson's solution to the problem is to remove the prerequisite of 
having the Security Council determine if such an act has occurred. Also, because the definition of 
aggression is so difficult to nail down, it ought to be omitted as a term in the jurisdiction of the 
court until it is properly defined). See id. Press commentary on the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia 
may be indicative of the potential quagmire ahead of the court in defining aggression. See Czech 
News, supra note 60 ("The concept of 'aggression,' which is only mentioned in the current ver-
sion of the statute, is currently being considered by the Preparatory Commission for the Court set 
up by the UN. The results of the negotiations should be interesting in view of the current air at-
tacks on Yugoslavia."). 
97. See Christopher Keith Hall, The Sixth Session of the UN Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 548, 551 (1998). 
98. See UN: Preparatory Commission for International Criminal Court concludes first ses-
sion at HQ, M2 Presswire, Mar. 2, 1999, available in 1999 WL 12607695. 
99. See id. 
100. The mandate of the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, is otherwise. Addressing the 
opening of the Preparatory Commission meeting in February 1999, he stated, "[Y]ou have to 
elaborate clear and unambiguous rules on the practice of the Court, and on the elements of the 
crimes over which it has jurisdiction." Establishing International Criminal Court will be Fitting 
way to Inaugurate New Millenium, M2 Presswire, Feb. 17, 1999, available in 1999 WL 
12605514. 
101. Senegal's signing was a move similar to signing a contract before material terms are 
settled. 
102. Nonetheless, some groups saw U.S. actions as obstructive. Jelena Pejic, a member of 
the Lawyers Comminee for Human Rights, stated, "Washington is attempting to redefine the 
crime of genocide until it is 'virtually impossible to prosecute."' Betsy Pisik, U.S. Seeks Changes 
to Accept International Criminal Court; Wants to Safeguard Troops from Frivolous Lawsuits 
Abroad, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1999, at A17, available in 1999 WL 3078969. 
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pers that indicated genocide was still a definition in progress. 103 The 
Rome treaty stated, '"genocide' means any of the following acts com-
mitted with intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group. " 104 A 
discussion paper at the March PrepCom meeting defined genocide 
somewhat differently: 
[T]he crime of genocide was the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, 
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Genocide shall also oc-
cur if the accused knew or should have known that his or her actions 
would destroy a group or the conduct was part of a pattern of similar 
conduct directed against that group . . . . Genocide by killing would 
occur if the accused killed one or more persons of a group in further-
ance of the intent to destroy it. 105 
Granted, the discussion paper is a work in process, not intended to 
be a final draft. Nevertheless, it is clear in the differences between the 
two that adoption and modification of elements may shift the intent of 
the treaty. The treaty did not indicate that the killing of one person 
would be sufficient to commit genocide. Whether or not delegates 
would have signed the treaty with the language of the discussion paper 
included is not known. Those believing that the Rome statute is the fi-
nal word are likely to be disappointed. They are likely to be subject to a 
different law than they originally thought. 
Definitional ambiguity is also highly problematic because of the 
philosophical underpinnings of criminal law. 
The interest in ensuring that crimes are carefully defined stems 
from the widespread agreement that the court adhere to the principle 
of legality. This fundamental principle of justice requires that there 
may be no crime or punishment without a preexisting law that prohib-
its the conduct and sets the penalty (nullum crimen, nulla poena, sine 
lege). It reflects the conviction that criminal law is intended to guide 
conduct and can do so only if people know in advance what is prohib-
ited. 106 
Therefore, the signing of a treaty purporting to adhere to these rule 
of law principles, when in fact few of the details are worked out, puts 
the credibility of the court into question even before it is formed. For 
example, the definition of genocide includes "[i]mposing measures in-
103. The Clinton administration has not been clear on its definition either. See Stephen J. 
Morris, Editorial, Clinton's Genocide Confusion, WALL Sr. 1., Jan. 12, 1999, at A22. 
104. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 71, at 1003. 
105. UN: Preparatory Commission for International Criminal Court concludes first session 
at HQ, M2 Presswire, Mar. 2, 1999, available in 1999 WL 12607695. 
106. MacPherson, supra note 12, at 51 (footnotes omitted). 
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tended to prevent births within the group. "107 A number of interpreta-
tions are possible from this, ranging from Nazi-style forced sterilization 
to UN-sponsored birth control programs. 108 The discussion paper from 
the March PrepCom meeting does little to clarify: "Genocide by pre-
venting births would occur if the accused imposed measures that were 
intended to prevent births within a group. " 109 Unlike the other elements 
of genocide referred to in the discussion paper, birth prevention did not 
include an intent element. Therefore, it makes no improvement on the 
treaty language. In order for the statute to make sense, ambiguities such 
as these must be resolved. 
Another inherent problem of ambiguity lies beyond the lack of 
definition of the elements in that the ICC prosecutor decides when to 
investigate based on referrals from any source. 110 He or she need only 
convince two of the three judges in the Pre-Trial council to proceed to 
prosecution. 111 This means that justicability may differ depending on a 
variety of circumstances rather than on a pre-determined policy. If the 
bar of justiciability is left too low, or open to broad interpretation, the 
Court risks being overrun with cases of little international signifi-
cance. 112 If the bar is too high, the Court is not credible because serious 
crimes go unpunished. 
C. Court Politics 
If the Rome Convention is any indication, this Court will not escape 
the extreme political pressures that characterized its inception. At the 
conference, when some delegates from conservative countries discov-
ered language espousing a broad definition of gender, 113 the negotia-
tions intensified substantially. 114 Additionally, some countries became 
concerned that the language of the treaty criminalizing enforced preg-
nancy and enforced motherhood might result in an international chal-
lenge to anti-abortion laws. 115 Another attempt was made by some 
107. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. supra note 72, at 1003. 
108. Even with the intent requirement for genocide this would still be a legitimate claim. An 
individual could argue that such a program is intended to reduce the population of a group. 
109. UN: Preparatory Commission for International Criminal Court concludes first session 
at HQ, M2 Presswire, Mar. 2, 1999, available in 1999 WL 12607695. 
110. See infra Part III.F. 
111. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 71, at 1022, 1032; 
see infra note 160. 
112. See Howard, supra note 8, at 121 ("The defining line between a crime against one hu-
man, and crimes against humanity in general is, at best, vague."). 
113. Some groups pushed for acceptance of language describing five different genders. 
114. See Moshan, supra note 59, at 154, 178-79. 
115. See id. at 175-76. 
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groups to get the delegates to agree on language that would remove the 
element of intent as a requirement for gender crimes. These attempts 
also became hotly debated issues, resolved by the delegates only in the 
final hours of the convention. 116 Proponents of these issues were not 
pleased with the outcome and later complained that the statute failed to 
protect women. 117 
Another dubious political move involved jurisdiction over terrorism 
and drug trafficking. 118 The United States and other countries have been 
involved for years in the process of formulating the ICC, and had come 
to an agreement leaving drug and terrorism crimes outside its jurisdic-
tion. 119 Nevertheless, they discovered on the last day of the Rome con-
ference that a small group of delegates had altered the text of the statute 
to include these crimes within the Court's jurisdiction. 120 
This would not be the only issue at the Rome conference decided 
behind closed doors by a small cadre of representatives. 121 On the last 
day of the conference, the treaty contained a stipulation barring states 
from taking reservations from portions of the statute that might conflict 
with their domestic laws. 122 The U.S. delegation had expected the treaty 
to include a right of reservation and was displeased at the last minute 
alteration. 123 
The United States was not the only country subject to political ma-
neuvering. Israel chose not to sign the treaty because the article de-
scribing war crimes would have criminalized the settlements on the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip. 124 Further, at a PrepCom meeting on the 
116. See id. at 178 n.152. The definition of gender was narrowed to "male and female" as a 
concession to Islamic states agreeing to the "inclusion of rape, forced pregnancy, and sexual slav-
ery." Not all women's groups were pleased with this result. See id. 
117. See id. at 178. 
118. See Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 14 (testimony of Ambassador David J. Scheffer). 
119. The U.S. feared the court would interfere with existing drug and terrorism interdiction 
programs and agencies in a detrimental way. 
120. See Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 14 (testimony of Ambassador David J. Scheffer). 
121. See id. at 15; David J. Scheffer, America's Stake in Peace, Security, and Justice (vis-
ited Mar. 19, 1999) <http://www .state.gov/www/policy _remark1998/980831_ scheffer _icc. 
html>. 
122. See Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 15 (testimony of Ambassador David J. Scheffer). 
123. Another concern the U.S. delegation expressed was that "the judges [selected would] 
not be confined to those from democratic countries with rule of law. The judges [would] be elected 
by a super majority of the state parties. Given that, the group of 77 developing countries in the 
U.N. General Assembly, which routinely vote against the United States and which is really more 
like 160 countries, could represent such a majority." See id. at 3 (opening statement of Senator 
Rod Grams) (expressing concern that ICC judges would be drawn disproportionately from coun-
tries unfriendly to the U.S. and from court systems vastly different from the U.S.). 
124. See Marilyn Henry, 'Palestine' Seeks Recognition on New International Criminal 
Court, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 28, 1999, available in 1999 WL 9000054; Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, supra note 71, at 1007 (stating that the direct or indirect transfer of 
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elements of crime, Israel objected to the Arab States' draft proposal 
giving a Palestinian state UN recognition. 125 Alan Baker, head of the 
Israeli delegation, declared, "The UN by definition is a political or-
ganization, so even when you are getting together to produce a statute 
for an international criminal court, which should not be something po-
litical, you inevitably get politically motivated activities." 126 
Perhaps political pressures are inherent in a convention seeking to 
produce a treaty. 127 However, a process that includes last minute 
changes not subject to the negotiation process does not bode well for 
the entity under creation. Such actions diminish the sense of ownership 
and loyalty that negotiators might otherwise feel towards the agreement 
because the pact then includes a position that could not have won on its 
own merits. 
Another example of the political pressure on the ICC is evident in 
the attempts to alter terms of the treaty after signing. Some groups, 
seeing the current version as best representing their interests, oppose 
any alteration at all. 128 The U.S. delegation, however, has made it clear 
that "key aspects of the treaty must be changed or the United States will 
actively work against it." 129 The U.S. is not the only force seeking 
changes in the trf'aty. Even among signatories, efforts are afoot to alter 
it. For example, in the first session of the PrepCom to establish rules of 
procedure and evidence, the French delegation introduced a proposal 
not fully in harmony with the text of the treaty. While stating that the 
"statute was a package that was completely supported by France," their 
proposal "did not digress profoundly" from it. 130 
the population of an occupying nation into the occupied territory is a war crime); Worldsources 
Online, Overcoming Reticence on International Criminal Court, WORLD TIMES, May 5, 1999. 
available in 1999 WL 15653415 [hereinafter Worldsources Online]. The U.S. Senate also ex-
pressed concern over this issue. See Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 23-25 (acknowledging that 
Israel would be exposed to liability under the ICC Statute). 
125. See Henry, supra note 124. 
126. /d. 
127. See Worldsources Online, supra note 124. Other numerous political moves at Rome 
included India's attempt to include the use of weapons of mass destruction as a crime. See id. 
Upon having this motion voted down, the Indian delegation complained, "The message this sends 
is that . . . the international community has decided that the use of nuclear weapons is not a 
crime." /d. Sri Lanka and Turkey abstained from the vote because terrorism was not included as a 
crime. See /d. China agreed with the U.S. that universal jurisdiction on core crimes and the power 
of the prosecutor were too broad, and voted against the treaty. See /d. Singapore abstained, ob-
jecting to the last minute changes worked behind closed doors by a small number of delegations, 
and objecting to other issues. See /d. 
128. Richard Dicker, legal advocate with Human Rights Watch, stated, "Protocol aimed at 
fixing what the United States objects to in this treaty could unravel this complex document." Pisik, 
supra note 102. 
129. /d. 
130. UN: Preparatory Commission for International Criminal Court begins first session, M2 
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Perhaps some departures are necessary to transform a treaty into a 
working document. Nevertheless, political pressure to alter the nature 
and scope of the ICC is omnipresent. Nations and interest groups, op-
posing the ICC, have applied substantial political pressure to date. It is 
foolish to believe that such pressure will diminish once the court is fully 
established. The treaty keeps the door to politics ajar by allowing an 
elective procedure on various court issues by member states in the fu-
ture. While oversight and control by the member states is necessary to 
maintain some semblance of a consensus-based organization, the op-
portunity to employ political pressure on the court in the future is trou-
bling. It places political jockeying ahead of judicial distance. Due to its 
immersion in ongoing international politics, the credibility of the court 
will always be in danger. 131 
D. Mission Creep: Can the ICC Refrain From Expanding? 
The Rome Treaty intends to create a court to handle world war 
crimes on the rationale that the ICC will deter would-be perpetrators. 132 
However, by providing for substantial future growth in the treaty, sup-
porters appear to disbelieve that result. Senator Rod Grams, chairman 
of the Senate Subcommittee on International Operations, stated: 
Supporters of this treaty are banking on the fact that the United 
States will allow this court to flourish and gain legitimacy over time. 
We must not allow that to happen. Even if it is weak at its inception, 
the Court's scope and its power can and will grow. This court will be 
an international institution without checks or balances, accountable to 
no states or institution for its actions, and there will be no way to ap-
peal its decisions except through the Court itself. 133 
The Senator's concerns are well founded. Proponents of the court 
pushed for the Rome treaty signing without having elements or rules of 
procedure in place. The crime of "aggression," according to the nego-
tiators, need not be defined until at least seven years after ratification. 134 
Presswire, Feb. 17, 1999, available in 1999 WL 12605515. 
131. For example, the political hazards of bringing Slobodan Milosevic to justice present just 
such a minefield. See Rabkin, supra note 21. 
132. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
BRIEFING SERIES, VOL. 2 No. 3 (1999) [hereinafter LAWYERS COMMITTEE]; but see Dempsey, 
supra note 69 (" [T]here is no evidence that holding war crimes trials reduces the number of threats 
to international peace and security. If anything, the opposite is true: making war less atrocious 
makes it more likely.") (quoting Alfred P. Rubin, Dayton, Bosnia and the Limits of Law, 46 
NAT'L INTEREST 44 (Winter 1996-97)). 
133. Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 3 (opening statement of Senator Rod Grams). 
134. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 71, at 1004, 1067. It 
should be noted that negotiations on the definition of "aggression" have proceeded informally 
during the PrepComs in 1999. Further, Phillipe Kirsch, Chairman of the PrepComs, announced in 
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The presumption of a growing jurisdiction, not only in territory, but 
also in types of crimes as well, is evident throughout the statute and in 
the statements of its supporters. For example, it is not sufficient for the 
court to address only a narrow class of international crimes. Some see 
the court as ultimately "act[ing] as a standard setting mechanism in the 
interpretation and application of international law and provid[ing] a 
model for national authorities in the administration of criminal jus-
tice. " 135 Placing the ICC as the interpreter of international criminal law 
dramatically exceeds the scope and intent of the Rome Statute. Never-
theless, if the court is successful, it may serve such a purpose. How-
ever, to hope that it will provide a model for national administration of 
criminal law implies a role all nations would find offensive because it 
implies they are incapable of developing a legitimate legal system. 
While some developing nations may look to the ICC to model their 
criminal code, most developed nations would resist such a model in fa-
vor of their system already in use. It is conceivable that reformers 
would seek to leverage change in their national judicial systems through 
seeking to expand the influence of the ICC into the domestic sphere. An 
obvious area where this would likely occur is capital punishment. If the 
ICC were to become the model of criminal justice, nations continuing 
to impose capital punishment would come under increasing pressure to 
alter their laws to conform to the international standard. Indeed, minor-
ity interests (including individual defendants with creative defense at-
torneys) could seek to use the ICC standard to overcome majority cho-
sen positions in criminal law. 
A troubling presumption of the proponents of the ICC is that insti-
tutional durability requires the ability to grow. 136 Their concern is that 
the world will use the court so infrequently that it will be incapable of 
garnering respect. 
The real threat to the court's stature is the prospect that it will be little 
used. If the international court is to command respect, it must have 
sufficient jurisdiction to play a real role in the struggle against inter-
August that beginning in the November/December PrepCom, aggression would receive full treat-
ment with formal and informal working groups meeting to discuss the definition. 
135. LAWYERS COMMITTEE, supra note 132. 
136. See MacPherson, supra note 12, at 56. MacPherson uses the United States Supreme 
Court as an example of how a court with a flexible size and description can well serve its constitu-
ent nation. See id. His antecedent complaint is the inability of the Court to try more than two cases 
concurrently. See id. The author seems to want to argue for the ability to expand the number of 
judges on the Court as need arose. See id. Using the U.S. Supreme Court as a desirable example 
of flexibility does not support this position. The U.S. solution to increasing case load has not been 
to increase the number of judges on the Supreme Court, rather, the Court has been given power to 
decline review, and does so in the vast majority of cases. This model would likely be rejected for 
an international court. 
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national crime. There is no danger that the court will be trivialized as 
long as it is making a valuable contribution to criminal justice. 137 
143 
Hence, the presumption of the ICC's supporters is that it will be used 
and expanded as necessary into the future. This presumption is trou-
bling for two reasons. First, if respect for an institution depends on us-
age, then those in the institution will see that it succeeds. It is the nature 
of any organization to justify its existence. Second, this position argues 
against the premise of deterrence. If the court is a successful deterrent, 
it cannot grow without expanding the list of crimes under its jurisdic-
tion. 
Mission Creep is also evident in the rhetoric of those urging that 
the court's jurisdiction should not be limited to specific crimes. 138 Al-
lowing the court to try crimes outside the list of most heinous interna-
tional crimes will further intrude upon state sovereignty. Consequently, 
the role of national judicial systems will be further eroded. Also, hear-
ing any case containing an international or transnational element that 
exceeds the current scope of court jurisdiction, will create precedent 
that could expand the role of the court beyond its treaty. 
E. Determination of Justice 
The purpose of a court is to determine what is just between a plain-
tiff and a defendant. The ICC complicates this process by claiming con-
current, or complementary, jurisdiction over some crimes. The stated 
ICC goal of complementarity139 is troubling because it appears to be 
unworkable. According to the treaty, the ICC will share jurisdiction 
over the named crimes with the national court system, only stepping in 
when the national system is "unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out 
the investigation or prosecution. " 140 Article 17 of the Rome statute lays 
out the factors to determine unwillingness: 
2. In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the court 
shall consider, having regard to the principles of due process recog-
nized by international law, whether one or more of the following ex-
ist, as applicable: 
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national 
decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person con-
cerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the juris-
diction of the Court . . . ; 
137. /d. at 46. 
138. See id. at 48. 
139. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 71, at 1002-03. 
140. See id. at 1012. 
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(b) There has been an unjustifiable delay in the proceedings . . . 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person ... to justice; 
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted inde-
pendently or impartially, and they were or are being conducted in 
a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an in-
tent to bring the person ... to justice. 141 
Article 17 also includes the elements for determining inability on 
the part of the national courts: "The court shall consider whether, due 
to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial 
system, the state is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evi-
dence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceed-
ings." 142 Therefore, although the stated goal of the court is to comple-
ment national court systems, the treaty clearly outlines processes for 
judicial review of national court decisions. 143 
There are, however, three problems with allowing the ICC to re-
view national court action. First, the statute provides no standard for 
judging its own terms. How long a delay in a national court will the 
ICC consider unjustifiable? Will it look to the national court system, or 
other UN court actions like the international tribunals in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda?144 When will the ICC deem a national court 
too partial or dependent? The statute is silent on these issues. 
The second prong of the problem with judicial review is that it may 
create another level of appeal for defendants before national courts. A 
national decision on a case having international parties, falling within or 
near the jurisdiction of the ICC, might produce an appeal by the losing 
party. The problem with such a scenario is that it exposes complemen-
tarity to be a sham. 145 If individuals are capable of appealing out of the 
court of last resort of their nation to the ICC, then the ICC will enjoy 
de facto judicial review. Such review will result in the imposition of 
ICC legal theory upon the national court systems. 
A final troubling concern over de facto judicial review is that the 




143. But see Human Rights Watch, Section E: Complementarity (visited May 5, 1999) 
<http://www .hrw .org/reports98/icc/jitbwb-07 .htm > . 
144. One wonders, given the lengthy incarcerations of suspects in Rwanda by the interna-
tional tribunal, whether that court would not be considered "unwilling" under the Rome Statute. 
145. See Dempsey, supra note 69 (positing that complementarity means the ICC could not 
overcome the verdict of a national trial or legislation, therefore the ICC would have to exercise 
judicial review to achieve its ends). 
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[I]f an ICC prosecutor wanted to investigate and charge the President 
of the United States for a bombing raid like the one President Reagan 
conducted in Libya, our only way to prevent the case from going for-
ward would be to have our own Justice Department investigate the 
President. If the U.S. Government then declined to prosecute, it 
would still be up to the judgment of the ICC whether to prosecute and 
pursue the case. 146 
145 
Such an outcome is another example of the incredibly intrusive na-
ture of the ICC statute. 147 The prosecutor's ability to initiate an investi-
gation based on a referral from NGOs, becomes the power to force 
such actions within a nation. This imposition will be unpalatable to any 
nation so coerced. 
F. The Vast Authority of the Prosecutor 
The Rome Statute grants broad powers to the prosecutor's office of 
the ICC. 148 For example, the prosecutor may investigate alleged crimes 
based on the referral of the UN Security Council, state parties, victims, 
NGOs, or any other reliable source. 149 The prosecutor determines the 
reliability of the source, as "he or she deems appropriate. "150 Some 
groups tout the ability to obtain referrals from non-state sources 
(NGOs, victims, etc.) as a most important victory because they feared 
states would be unwilling to refer situations to the court. 151 While states 
or the UN Security Council may indeed be less willing to refer situa-
tions to the prosecutor at times, it is transparently obvious that some 
groups will refer situations frequently. This may result in an inundation 
of referrals from some groups or individuals. 
A hazard in allowing NGOs to refer is that the political leanings of 
the prosecutor may become involved in the decision to investigate. 
Hence, the propensity of the prosecutor to agree or disagree with the 
group may determine the furtherance of the investigation. A prosecutor 
may investigate, or refuse to investigate, dependent on her ideological 
kinship with the referring group; the prosecutor might see the investi-
146. See Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 2 (opening statement of Senator Rod Grams). 
147. See Rabkin, supra note 21. It may be just as difficult to prosecute Slobodan Milosevic 
for the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo. See id. 
148. See Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 26-28 (testimony of Ambassador David J. Schef-
fer) (acknowledging the powers and limitations of the office of prosecutor). Prosecutors with any 
semblance of independence are currently disfavored in the U.S. See Rabkin, supra note 21. 
149. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 71, at lOll. 
150. See id. 
151. See Human Rights Watch, Sum"Ulry of the Key Provisions of the ICC Statute (visited 
May 5, 1999) <http://www.hrw.org/hrw/campaigns/icc/icc-statute.htm> [hereinafter Key Provi-
sions of the ICC Statue]. 
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gation as an opportunity to further or stymie a political goal depending 
on the source of the referral. 152 
The United States and several other nations felt this power was too 
broad. This feeling formed one of the reasons for not signing the treaty. 
Senator Rod Grams articulated this concern in a hearing before the 
U.S. Senate: "[T]he [ICC] prosecutor will have the power to initiate 
prosecutions without a referral from the Security Council or state par-
ties. There will be no effective screen against politically motivated 
prosecutions from being brought forward. " 153 Ambassador Scheffer 
suggested that there existed a legitimate reason for referrals to come 
from member states or the Security Council. He made the following 
statement: 
The value of having a government refer it or the Security Council 
refer it is they are accountable to somebody. They are accountable 
either to their people, their populace, for doing so, or the Security 
Council is accountable to the United Nations system. We believe that 
that fundamental principle of accountability should be at the core of 
referrals to this court. 154 
The Pre-Trial Chamber of the court has the power to deny the fur-
therance of an investigation by the prosecutor. 155 Nevertheless, the 
prosecutor has the power to investigate situations with no oversight be-
fore she must submit it to the Pre-Trial Chamber. 156 In addition, she 
may return with a new request based on new evidence regarding the 
same situation. 157 Therefore, a persistent prosecutor, backed by groups 
or individuals, may pursue a particular individual or group she believes 
responsible for a crime until the Pre-Trial Chamber allows the investi-
gation to proceed towards court action. Also, even with the Pre-trial 
Council, decisions to prosecute can be made by three persons. For in-
ternational crimes of the magnitude this court is designed to deal with, 
three seems to be a small number. 158 
Proponents of the court claim that the power of the prosecutor is 
quite limited. However, outside of having to meet some requirements 
152. See Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 23 (testimony of Ambassador David J. Scheffer). 
153. See id. at 3 (opening statement of Senator Rod Grams). 
154. !d. at 23. 
155. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 71, at 1011. 
156. See id. at 999. This includes the power to go to the site of a crime, talk independently 
to witnesses and collect evidence. See id. When national authorities are investigating, the prose-
cutor may still be present, and may still take voluntary testimony outside of the national investiga-
tors presence. See id. 
157. Seeid. at 1011. 
158. This process is further evidence of the immense power of the ICC judges and prosecu-
tor. 
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before investigating within a state, 159 the limitations they cite are dubi-
ous at best. The limitations they point to arise in Article 53 of the treaty 
and consist mainly of a set of factors the prosecutor should consider be-
fore pursuing an investigation. Article 53 states: 
The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made available 
to him or her, initiate an investigation unless he or she determines that 
there is no reasonable basis to proceed under this statute. In deter-
mining whether to initiate an investigation, the Prosecutor shall con-
sider whether: 
(a) The information available ... provides a reasonable basis to 
believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been 
or is being committed; 
(b) The case is . . . admissible under article 17; and 
(c) Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interest 
of the victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe 
that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice. 160 
These discretionary considerations amount to limitations addressing 
only whether a crime has been committed, whether jurisdiction exists, 
admissibility of evidence, and other potential overriding political con-
cerns. These reservations are minimal. The statute contains qualifica-
tions that allow the prosecutor to have great leeway in initiating investi-
gations. For example, "reasonable basis" is a low bar to investigation. 
Therefore, the discretion of the prosecutor is quite broad, 161 extending 
to all aspects of evidence gathering, taking of oral and written testi-
mony, and so forth. 162 One of the greatest concerns expressed by non-
signing nations is the prosecutor's power to initiate an investigation 
without supervision of any kind. Nothing in the treaty appears to limit 
this power. 
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
Something must be done on the international level to address the 
159. See Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 27 (testimony of Ambassador David J. Scheffer) 
(indicating tbat tbe prosecutor must work cooperatively witb national authorities, and that he or 
she does not have ready access throughout tbe world). 
160. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 71, at 1028. The remain-
der of Article 53 spells out tbe Prosecutor's duties if he or she chooses not to continue tbe investi-
gation, and tbe Pre-Trial Council's power of review of such a decision. See id. 
161. See supra Part III. F. 
162. Claims tbat the prosecutor's power is limited are questionable. For example, tbe Hu-
man Rights Watch lists tbe Pre-Trial Council's power to review a decision NOT to investigate as 
tbe main limitation. See Key Provisions of the ICC Statute, supra note 151. Review of a decision 
not to prosecute in no way limits decisions to prosecute. See id. 
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problem of atrocities and war crimes. Jose A vala Lasso, the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights stated that it is an "obscenity" that "a 
person stands a better chance of being tried and judged for killing one 
human being than for killing 100,000. " 163 Such a record is intolerable. 
If the ICC is untenable because of its effects on state sovereignty, what 
should the international community do? Several ideas are worthy of 
consideration. 
With the end of Apartheid and the election of Nelson Mandela, 
South Africa seemed poised to commence the process of tribunals to 
address past crimes. Instead, South Africa opted for a more conciliatory 
approach. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established to 
address human rights abuses during Apartheid. The commission has 
emphasized gathering information over assigning guilt, and has even 
extended pardons for individuals who cooperate. It is not clear what the 
result will be, nor is it clear that this would be the best approach to re-
place the ICC. Nevertheless, it is an alternative worth considering. 164 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission's approach to international 
situations may allow for speedier national and ethnic healing, though it 
may not fully address the retributive feelings of the victims. The prob-
lem with such an approach, in addition to lacking an element of pun-
ishment, is that it requires a stable, credible government to operate it. 
Additionally, internationalists would worry that the actions of such a 
commission would become a sham to protect the guilty. 165 
Another alternative to the ICC would be to continue with the ad hoc 
tribunals similar to those operating in Rwanda and the former Yugosla-
via. The ability to address issues on a case-by-case basis would offer 
greater flexibility to the tribunals, and allow international intervention 
to bring perpetrators to justice. Presumptively, there would be less con-
cern of "victor's justice" because of the international involvement. The 
court could minimize transportation and evidence-gathering costs by 
operating in the country where the crimes occurred, rather than at a 
distance. The tribunals in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia have not 
been problem free. Those favoring, as well as those opposing the ICC 
cite these tribunals to support their positions. It may be, however, that 
if the ad hoc tribunal approach had time to ripen as an international 
process, it would prove to be a successful and efficient way of dealing 
with the core crimes of the ICC statute. 
163. Wexler, supra note 12, at 711 (quoting International Criminal Tribuna/for the Former 
Yugoslavia Bulletin, No. 8, 10-VII-1996, at 1). 
164. See Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 51 (prepared statement of John R. Bolton). 
165. See id. at 51-52 (pointing out that there may be some instances where a full public air-
ing of past misdeeds would be more harmful than helpful). 
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Perhaps the best alternative to the ICC that would help preserve 
national sovereignty while addressing the pertinent crimes, would be to 
allow states to handle such prosecutions domestically. 166 The United 
Nations involvement in this regard would be to help developing coun-
tries create judicial systems that are credible within the scope of na-
tional law. The UN could accomplish this by establishing international 
judicial standards palatable to both civil and common law traditions, 
and offering aid in the form of funds and expert consultants to assist 
countries in the development of their judicial systems. With a solid ju-
diciary in place, nations could deal with the human rights crimes that 
might occur. Some may wonder how national tribunals would deal with 
individual perpetrators at high levels of government, and argue this is 
precisely the reason an ICC is needed. However, if the national justice 
system could not address such individuals, the political process cer-
tainly could. Therefore, with international guidance to help stabilize 
national legal and political systems, nations could handle their own hu-
man rights abuses. 167 
Perhaps the greatest lesson of international intervention has been 
this: until local populations and governments are ready and capable of 
dealing with their problems on their own, the problems remain unre-
solved regardless of the number of peacekeepers and foreign aid. It 
may be that John Bolton is right when he said, "[t]o create an interna-
tional tribunal for the task [of rendering justice] implies immaturity on 
the part of [the nations] and paternalism on the part of the international 
community. Repeated interventions by global powers are no substitute 
for [the nation] coming to terms with themselves. "168 
Given the imperialistic past (and present) of the developed world, 
international intervention in the form of ad hoc tribunals or of an inter-
national criminal court may be perceived as the imperialism of the new 
millenium. 169 States already rail at the orientation of the legal philoso-
phy of the ICC. When fully implemented, some may rightly fear that 
once again, the wealthy industrialized world will impose its values on 
developing nations. 170 
166. Perhaps one way to support domestic prosecution is to work towards an international 
treaty on extradition that would require signers to release criminals responsible for international 
crimes to national jurisdictions seeking them. See MacPherson, supra note 12, at 20. 
167. Handling these issues on a national basis would also serve the purpose of leaving na-
tional legal philosophies intact, without imposing a foreign notion of justice on a nation. 
168. See Senate Hearing, supra note 36, at 52 (prepared statement of John R. Bolton). 
169. See, e.g., Rabkin, supra note 21 ("Somebody might even get into [Slobodan 
Milosevic's] head that Serbs too, can demand 'justice' for attacks on civilian targets designed to 
terrorize people into submission."). 
170. For an alternative view on resolving international crime, see Carrie Gustafson, Com-
ment, International Criminal Courts: Some Dissident Views on the Continuation of War by Penal 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Finally, the ICC fails to address the problem that it identifies. Jus-
tice is an attempt to set things right, after the crime has been commit-
ted. The genocide, ethnic cleansing, and mass rapes have been com-
mitted long before the judicial process can begin. By the time evidence 
has been gathered and suspects apprehended, the value of the judicial 
remedy begins to degrade, particularly when dealing with crimes on a 
massive scale. Ultimately, life incarceration remains unlikely for the 
chief perpetrators if historical precedent means anything. 171 Therefore, 
any deterrent value that the establishment of the ICC might have is 
likely only to persuade nations sending peacekeeping troops to think 
twice before doing so. 
The international community appropriately desires the end to 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, and aggression. The 
experience of generations has been that punishment, while important, is 
at best a poor remedy for the victims. The victim's greatest desire is to 
avoid victimization in the first place. Therefore, the best solutions to 
today's humanitarian crises lie not in adjudication that is too late for the 
traumatized victims, but in prevention. Perhaps Carrie Gustafson is 
right, and justice such as is envisioned by the ICC should be abandoned 
because it only perpetuates violence. 172 Perhaps adherence to the tenets 
of the world's greatest moral and ethical philosophers would provide a 
better solution to both international crime and punishment. 173 Preven-
tion, whatever its form, of war and criminal activity may be as difficult 
to achieve as effective punishment provided for by the ICC. The ICC 
statute and the premises underlying it are unacceptable, primarily be-
cause of the unprecedented erosion it would work on state sovereignty. 
Finding a means to prevent crime renders the court unnecessary, and 
therefore, prevention is the more laudable international goal. 
David A. Nil! 
Means, 21 Hous. J. INT'LL. 51 (1998). 
171. See id. Though the Rome Statute states that all individuals, regardless of position, are 
equally liable to investigation and prosecution, state cooperation will not be equally available de-
pending on the position and popularity of the suspect. See id. Therefore, state leaders will remain 
much less likely to be prosecuted than lower level functionaries. See id. This is true even of na-
tional leaders considered to be perpetrators. See id. 
172. See Gustafson, supra note 170. Incarceration as penology forms the basis of the ICC, 
and it is this type of penology that Gustafson avers perpetuates violence. See id. 
173. See id. 
